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KESAN BIAS KOGNITIF PEDAGANG SAHAM ATAS SIFAT-SIFAT 
PSIKOLOGI DAN KEYAKINAN DAN PENYELESAIANNYA: SATU 
KAJIAN EKSPERIMEN 
ABSTRAK 
 
Pedagang saham cenderung menbuat keputusan berdasarkan intuisi mereka 
yang menjurus bias kognitif seperti “confirmation bias”, “self-serving bias” dan 
“hindsight bias”. Bias ini membuat pedagang saham mempamerkan sifat-sifat 
psikologi terlalu yakin seperti “miscalibration”, “better than average effect” dan 
“illusion of control” dan demikian, mempamerkan bias terlalu yakin dalam 
pembuatan keputusan mereka di pasaran sekuriti. Tesis ini bertujuan untuk 
memeriksa hubungan antara bias kognitif, sifat-sifat psikologi terlalu yakin dan bias 
terlalu yakin, dan mekanisme-mekanisme meminimumkan bias terlalu yakin antara 
pedagang saham individu, dengan jumlah perdagangan dan ralat ramalan harga 
sebagai proksi. Kajian ini dibahagikan kepada dua peringkat uji kaji makmal iaitu 
tiga rawatan kawalan dan enam rawatan utama. Mata pelajaran di semua rawatan 
dipengaruhi dengan bias kognitif. Ukuran sifat-sifat psikologi terlalu yakin 
dikumpulkan melalui soal selidik di eksperimen, manakala jumlah perdagangan dan 
ralat ramalan harga dikumpulkan dari mekanisme dagangan mudah. Mekanisme 
“Feedback” dan “Contradicting Reason” diuji atas keberkesanan mereka dalam 
mengurangkan bias terlalu yakin di pedagang saham individu. Keputusan eksperimen 
menyimpulkan bahawa terdapat hubungan penting antara “confirmation bias” dan 
“miscalibration”, dan “self-serving bias” dan “better than average effect”. Mata 
pelajaran dengan pengesahan “confirmation bias” membuat ralat ramalan harga yang 
lebih besar dibandingkan dengan mata pelajaran tanpa “confirmation bias” dan mata 
 xiv 
pelajaran dengan “self-serving bias” mempunyai jumlah perdagangan yang lebih 
daripada mata pelajaran tanpa “self-serving bias”.  Mekanisme-mekanisme 
penyelesaian berkesan dalam mengurangkan tahap keyakinan terutamanya bagi mata 
pelajaran dengan pengesahan “confirmation bias”. 
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THE EFFECT OF TRADERS’ COGNITIVE BIASES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ATTRIBUTES AND CONFIDENCE AND ITS SOLUTIONS: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Traders tend to make decisions based on their intuition, which leads to 
cognitive biases such as confirmation bias, self-serving bias and hindsight bias. 
These biases cause traders to display psychological attributes of overconfidence such 
as miscalibration, better than average effect and illusion of control over a decision, 
and thus, display overconfidence bias in their decision-making in the securities 
market. This thesis aims to examine the relationship between cognitive biases, 
psychological attributes of overconfidence and overconfidence bias, and solution 
mechanisms so as to minimise overconfidence bias among individual traders, with 
trading volume and price prediction error as the proxy.  The study consists of three 
experimental series. Each series again is divided into a control treatment and two 
sub-main treatments. Each treatment consists of two main periods, where in the sub-
main treatments subjects are treated by mechanism before the second period starts to 
reduce cognitive biases. The measurement of psychological attributes was collected 
through a questionnaire in the experiment, and the trading volume and price 
prediction error were deduced from a simple trading mechanism. Feedback and 
contradicting reason mechanism were tested as to their effectiveness in reducing 
overconfidence bias in individual traders. The results suggested that there is 
significant relationship between confirmation bias and miscalibration, and self-
 xvi 
serving bias and better than average effect. Subjects with confirmation bias made 
larger price prediction errors compared with subjects without confirmation bias, and 
subjects with self-serving bias traded more than subjects without self-serving bias. 
Solution mechanisms were effective in reducing the psychological attribute, trading 
volume and price prediction error especially for subjects with confirmation bias.  
 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis studies the issues of cognitive biases in the psychological attributes, 
and trading behaviours of traders, and its effects on overconfidence bias exhibited by 
traders in the securities market. The literature has highlighted the role of 
overconfidence bias, and this thesis is interested in looking at overconfidence bias 
from a cognitive and psychological perspective, particularly the cognitive and 
psychological reasons underlying overconfidence bias. Measurements of confidence 
levels are always given in the literature as miscalibration, the better than average 
effect and the illusion of control.  
The thesis suggests that understanding the cognitive reasons of psychological 
attributes (i.e. miscalibration, better than average effect and illusion of control) will 
enable identification of the reasons for overconfidence bias, and help in suggesting 
ways to mitigate the bias in stock trading. The thesis adopts psychological solutions 
such as the feedback method (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980) and the contradicting 
reason method (Koriat, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980) in overcoming 
overconfidence bias influenced by cognitive bias at an individual level. These two 
methods were selected because they are simple and can be carried out easily by an 
individual trader or securities firm at minimum cost.  
The thesis aims to conduct an in-depth study on the direct relationship between 
cognitive bias and its psychological attributes. It has been noted that overconfidence 
is a consequence of psychological attributes such as miscalibration, better than 
average effect and illusion of control (Merkle & Weber, 2011), and therefore, it is 
important to examine the psychological roots of the overconfidence phenomenon in 
the securities market. The controlled laboratory experimental method was used to 
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conduct this research because an experimental setting has the advantage of allowing 
for a direct test of the relationship between cognitive bias, psychological attribute 
and trading behaviours. This chapter will start with a background of the study  
(Section 1.1), an introduction to the definitions of cognitive bias, psychological 
attributes and overconfidence bias adopted in this thesis (Section 1.2), followed by 
Section 1.3 to Section 1.6, which will explain the problem statement, research 
questions, objectives of the study and significance of the study, respectively. 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) assumes that the agents are always 
rational and efficient. EMH hypothesises that the prices of securities will always 
“fully reflect” all available information in the market and that there is no arbitrage 
opportunity (Fama, 1970). Traditional economic theory manifested in EMH assumes 
that traders are always rational, by incorporating all relevant information into the 
decision-making process to generate optimal financial decisions. This hypothesis 
dominated the financial market around the world until the Black Monday crash in 
1987 when U.S. stock prices fell over 20% in a day without any important news 
(Shiller, 1987).  
The inability of EMH to explain the Black Monday crash, and also empirical 
evidence such as the deviation of prices from fundamental values, including stock 
and market bubbles around the world (e.g. Holland‟s Tulip Mania (1634), the South 
Sea Bubbles in England (1720), the ASEAN financial crisis (1997), the Dot.com 
bubble (2000) and the severe recession in 2007-2008) have led scholars in 
behavioural finance to relax the rationality assumption of individual traders and use 
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overconfidence bias to explain anomalies in the financial market (e.g. Shiller, 1987, 
2000; Odean, 1999; Dittrich, Güth & Maciejovsky, 2005; Glaser & Weber, 2007; 
Deaves, Luders & Luo, 2009; Smith, 2012; Merkle, 2013; Prosad, Kapoor & 
Sengupta, 2013; Broihanne, Merli & Roger, 2014).  
 Overconfidence bias is pervasive in the securities market, and it has been 
shown to be one of the major causes of financial instability in the world. Shefrin 
(2000, p.xii) says that “most traders are overconfident about their vulnerability to 
psychological induced errors, and although intelligent, not as intelligent as they 
believe themselves to be.” People are always over-optimistic in the stock market, and 
this behaviour leads to boom and bust (Shiller, 2000). Overconfidence bias is not 
only committed by individual traders or novice traders; institutional advisors and 
professional traders also exhibit different degrees of overconfidence bias (Deaves, 
Lüders & Schröder, 2010; Chou & Wang, 2011; Chuang & Susmel, 2011; Menkhoff, 
Schmeling & Schmidt, 2013; Broihanne et al., 2014). 
Chuang and Lee (2006) summarised the characteristics and behaviours of 
traders with “overconfidence bias” as follows. First, overconfident traders 
overestimate the precision of their information received (e.g. Kyle & Wang, 1997; 
Benos, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Chuang & Lee, 2006; Ko 
& Huang, 2007; Yeh & Yang, 2011). Secondly, traders trade more aggressively in 
the period subsequent to a gain (e.g. Kyle & Wang, 1997; Benos, 1998; Gervais & 
Odean, 2001; Chuang & Lee, 2006; Deaves et al., 2009; Hsu & Shiu, 2010; Kliger & 
Levy, 2010; Chou & Wang, 2011; Michailova, 2011; Yeh & Yang, 2011). Thirdly, 
excessive trading of overconfident traders in the securities market contributes to 
observed excessive volatility (e.g. Odean, 1998; Chuang & Lee, 2006; Yeh & Yang, 
2011; Huisman, van der Sar & Zwinkels, 2012) and fourth, overconfident traders 
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underestimate risk and trade more in riskier security (e.g. Merkle, 2013). 
Overconfident traders also tend to make higher price prediction errors (e.g. Bondt & 
Thaler, 1985; Shiller, 1987; Smith, Suchanek & Williams, 1988; De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers & Waldmann, 1990; Shiller, 2000; Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003; Friesen & 
Weller, 2006; Hilary & Menzly, 2006; Michailova, 2011) and perform badly 
compared to traders who are not overconfident (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2000; Gervais 
& Odean, 2001; Dittrich & Maciejovsky, 2002; Dittrich et al., 2005; Hsu & Shiu, 
2010; Michailova, 2010). The thesis uses excessive trading (i.e. trading volume) and 
price prediction (i.e. price prediction error) as proxies for overconfidence bias.  
Scholars have also studied ways to reduce investment mistakes in the securities 
market, such as by providing more financial information to less informed traders 
(Bloomfield, Libby & Nelson, 1999; Forbes & Kara, 2010) and improving the 
financial knowledge of traders (Chou & Wang, 2011). Other recommendations 
include providing general guidelines to understand and identify investment 
objectives and constraints, developing qualitative investment to avoid investing 
based on emotion, rumour, and stories, diversifying investment portfolios and 
performing annual reviews to reallocate assets (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002).  
Overconfidence bias persists in the market (Shiller, 2014), however, and so far, there 
has been limited work on the solution to overconfidence bias in traders.   
 
1.2 Definition of Cognitive Bias, Psychological Attributes and Overconfidence 
Bias 
 
 
As  Wilke and Mata (2012, p.531) note, “Cognitive bias: Systematic error in 
judgment and decision-making common to all human beings, which can be due to 
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cognitive limitations, motivational factors, and/or adaptations to natural 
environments.” This thesis studied cognitive biases of overconfidence such as 
confirmation bias, self-serving bias and hindsight bias. Confirmation bias means that 
people tend to look for confirming evidence that supports their decisions, and to 
reject that evidence that does not support their belief or hypothesis (Koriat et al., 
1980). Self-serving bias refers to people‟s tendency to attribute success to their 
internal or personal factors but attribute failure to external or situational factors 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988; Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak & Vredenburg, 1995). 
Hindsight bias happens when people tend to distort their previous judgment, 
memory, actual facts or previous information, based on information received after 
knowing the actual outcome (Thompson, Armstrong & Thomas, 1998).  
Psychological attributes, in this thesis, are psychological attributes of 
overconfidence such as miscalibration, the better than average effect, and the illusion 
of control. These are also known as psychometric measures of judgment biases 
(Glaser & Weber, 2007). Miscalibration is a systematic overestimation of the 
precision of own knowledge, and an underestimation of the variance of random 
variables (Koriat et al., 1980; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, 1981). Better than 
average effect refers to the boundless ability, as a human being, to think that ones 
own self is smarter or more capable than others (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Smith, 
2012). The illusion of control happens when people overestimate personal success 
probabilities (Langer, 1975). 
In this thesis overconfidence bias is reflected in the trading behaviours of 
overconfident traders in securities markets, such as larger price prediction errors and 
excessive trading volume. Both large price prediction errors and excessive trading 
volume are used as proxies for the trading behaviours of overconfident traders 
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because first, they could be collected easily from the experiment and second, 
individual traders decided the predicted price and number of stock to trade in the 
experiment. This could ensure that the data was really reflecting the behaviours of 
individual traders. Price prediction error refers to the price difference between the 
predicted price and the actual price, and trading volume refers to the number of 
shares traded by traders. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
On many occasions, traders do not act as postulated by the expected utility 
(EU) theory or efficient market hypothesis (EMH), in which traders always 
maximise income, taking into account all available information about the market. 
What has been widely observed instead, is that traders tend to make decisions based 
on intuition, and are vulnerable to cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias, self-
serving bias and hindsight bias, which affect their decision-making processes.  It has 
been noted in the literature that these biases play an important role in the investment 
process and are the main culprits in causing overconfidence among traders.  
The causal relationship between cognitive biases and overconfidence has been 
widely reported in the literature, but the mechanism underlying the relationship is not 
widely known.  What has been studied so far indicates that cognitive biases can 
affect an trader‟s confidence, but how the confidence is built and how the 
information is processed have not been widely explored in the economics literature.  
Although the psychology literature has pointed out that people miscalibrate 
information due to confirmation bias, perceive themselves as better than others due 
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to self-serving bias, and perceive a situation as perfectly under their control due to 
hindsight bias, the impact on investment decisions is not empirically proven (Skata, 
2008). 
It has been widely suggested in the literature that enhancing one‟s financial 
knowledge could help to reduce mistakes and biases in making investment decisions, 
but instead of reducing biases, the knowledge gained may sometimes aggravate a 
situation; traders may feel more confident at the time when decision is made.  
Traders who suffer from confirmation bias may become more overconfident in their 
predictions and trading.  What is required is a mechanism that can help to mitigate 
the cognitive bias that causes overconfidence bias.  
This thesis tests two solution mechanisms, feedback and contradicting reason 
mechanisms, to minimise the effect of the cognitive biases on psychological 
attributes and their impact on overconfidence in the securities market. Finding ways 
to minimise overconfidence has always been the biggest challenge in financial 
markets, but so far, most of the solution mechanisms focus on financial knowledge 
enhancement instead of the underpinning psychological reasons. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
This thesis specifically aims to answer three research questions.  
i. Is there any significant difference in psychological attributes between subjects 
with and without cognitive bias? 
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ii. Is there any significant difference in trading behaviours between subjects with 
and without cognitive bias?  
iii. Do feedback and contradicting reason mechanisms help to reduce overconfidence 
bias? Which is the best method to minimise the level of overconfidence bias? 
 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
 
This thesis explores the impact of psychological bias on economic decision-
making and the application of trading in the securities market in a laboratory 
experimental design. The study examines the relationship between confirmation bias 
and miscalibration, self-serving bias and better than average effect, hindsight bias 
and illusion of control, and measures the correlation with economic variables such as 
price prediction and trading volume (i.e. as a proxy for overconfidence bias). The 
specific objectives are listed as the following: 
i. To determine the relationship between confirmation bias and miscalibration, self-
serving bias and better than average effect, and hindsight bias and illusion of 
control.  
ii. To investigate the relationship between trading behaviours such as trading 
volume and price prediction error with confirmation bias, self-serving bias and 
hindsight bias.  
iii.  To determine which mechanism, feedback or contradicting reason mechanism, is 
an effective solution to reduce overconfidence bias in individual subjects 
influenced by cognitive bias. 
 
 9 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 
So far, very few studies in the current literature have examined the relationship 
between cognitive bias and psychological attributes, and offered possible solutions to 
reduce overconfidence bias during decision-making in the securities market. The 
thesis contributes to the current research in the following ways.  
i. The existing literature focuses on either the relationship between psychological 
attributes such as miscalibration, better than average effect and illusion of control 
with overconfidence bias, or cognitive biases such as confirmation bias, self-
serving bias and hindsight bias with overconfidence bias. Detailed explanations 
for the reasons for, or factors underlying, the psychological attributes, have not 
been offered. In the second relationship, cognitive biases and overconfidence 
bias, details are not provided of how the subjects react to and process 
information. This thesis relates the cognitive biases to the psychological 
attributes to provide a better understanding of the cognitive reasons behind 
psychological attributes of overconfidence and the effect of cognitive biases on 
trading behaviour.  
ii. The thesis identifies different types of psychological attributes of overconfidence 
(i.e. miscalibration, better than average effect and illusion of control) influenced 
by respective cognitive bias  (i.e. confirmation bias, self-serving bias and illusion 
of control) and their impact on trading behaviours, which has not been explored 
before.  
iii. The existing solutions for overconfidence bias in the financial market focus on 
financial knowledge and knowledge enhancement. This study explores 
psychological solution methods, such as the feedback mechanism and 
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contradicting reason mechanism, in order to identify possible solutions to 
overcome the psychological roots of overconfidence. These two mechanisms 
were chosen because they are simple, and can be executed by individual traders 
and securities firms.  
 
1.7 Summary 
 
 
Based on the above, Chapter One summarises that overconfidence bias is 
pervasive in stock markets and therefore, it is important to understand the cognitive 
reasons for overconfidence bias so that an appropriate solution mechanism can be 
developed to minimise it among individual traders and improve their trading 
behaviour. This might contribute to the stability of financial market. 
The thesis is structured in the following manner: Chapter Two presents the 
conceptual framework, Chapter Three discusses related literature on overconfidence 
in psychology and finance, Chapter Four describes the experimental design and 
organisation, Chapter Five presents the experimental results and discussion and 
conclusions follows in Chapter Six. 
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CHAPTER 2 - CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter discusses the frameworks of expected utility theory, violation of 
expected utility theory and prospect theory, and then relates them to cognitive biases, 
psychological attributes and overconfidence bias in the securities market.  
 
2.1 Expected Utility (EU) Theory and Violation of Expected Utility Theory 
 
In standard economic theory, people are said to make a rational choice if they 
choose an alternative whereby the marginal benefit is more than the marginal cost.  
One of the most prominent works in rationality is “Expected Utility Theory” by 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) (a.k.a. VNM). Under VNM‟s EU theory, choices 
are evaluated based on a known probability of various possible outcomes. For 
instance, U( ) is the utility function;  u(XA), u(XB) ….are the utilities obtained from 
each possible outcome XA, XB,… and PA, PB....are the known probabilities for each 
outcome. People will choose the alternative yielding the highest expected utility by 
multiplying probabilities with possible outcomes as follows:  
  ( )       (  )       (  )         (  ) 
The model assumes that people know the correct probability for each state 
under a risky situation and that they make decisions based on the stated probability. 
EU theory assumes that humans are rational; it facilitates people in making choices 
by allowing them to rank all the choices from the highest utility to the lowest utility. 
It also assumes that people can make decisions rationally without the influence of 
emotions.  
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Table 2.1 Experiments by Maurice Allais (1953) 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
1.00 $1million 0.89 $1million 0.89 $0 0.90 $0 
  0.01 $0 0.11 $1million 0.10 $5million 
  0.10 $5million     
 
 
In a seminal paper by Allais (1953), however, showed that humans did not act 
as predicted in EU theory. The first example of violations of EU theory can be seen 
in the example given in Allais Paradox, as in the experiment findings detailed in 
Table 2.1. In Experiment 1, subjects were asked to choose between option S1 and S2. 
Based on EU theory, people should choose the investment with the highest return.  
The expected payoff from S1 was 1*$1 million = $1 million and S2 was 0.89*$1 
million + 0.1*$5 million = $1.39 million. The experimental result showed that 
participants in the experiment preferred S1 to S2. The order of preference can be 
written as    (         )        (         )        (  )      
 (         ) in Experiment 1. 
In Experiment 2, participants were asked to choose between options S3 and 
S4, and the experimental result showed that the majority of the subjects chose S4. The 
preference can be written as       (  )        (         )       (  )  
     (         )  or        (         )        (  )       (         )  
Substituting       (         )  with    (         ) –        (         ) from 
experiment 1, we get     (         )           (         )          (  )   
        (         ). The preference contradicts that made by the same subjects in 
Experiment 1.  The violation in Experiment 1 was caused by the certainty effect 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b). The certainty effect involves a situation where 
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people overweigh sure outcomes and under weigh outcomes that are uncertain, as 
seen in Experiment 1.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979b) also found that risk behaviours are domain 
specific, in which people are risk-averse in a gain domain, but risk-seeking in loss 
domain. The second example of violations of the EU theory can be explained by the 
reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b). The reflection effect implies that 
people are risk-averse in a gain domain and risk-seeking in a loss domain.  Table 2.2 
shows that people are risk-averse by choosing S2 in a gain domain and risk-seeking 
by choosing S1 in a loss domain. 
 
Table 2.2 Reflection effect by Kahneman and Tversky (1979b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: N is the total number of subjects and * is the dominant choice. 
 
Based on the gain domain in Table 2.2, the expected payoff for S1 was $3,200 
and S2 was $3,000. Based on EU theory, people should choose S1 with a higher 
expected payoff, but because people were risk-averse in a gain domain, they chose S2 
instead of S1.  In the loss domain in Table 2.2, the expected payoff for S1 was -
$3,200 and S2 was -$3,000. Based on EU theory, people should choose S2, with 
lower potential loss, however, people were risk-seeking by selecting S1 in the loss 
domain.  
 
 S1 S2 
Gain Domain 
N =100 
(0.80, $4000) 
20 
(1, $3000) 
80* 
Loss Domain 
N =100 
(0.8, -$4000) 
92* 
(1, -$3000) 
18 
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The third example of violations of EU theory is overweighing very low 
probability and under weighing high probability (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b). The 
experimental findings showed that people tend to overweigh very low probability in 
a gain domain and preferred a very small loss in a loss domain. Table 2.3 shows that 
people choose S1 in a gain domain and S2 in a loss domain.  
Table 2.3  Probability weighing anomalies by Kahneman & Tversky (1979b)  
  S1 S2 
Gain Domain 
N =100 
(0.001, $5000) 
72* 
(1, $5) 
28 
Loss Domain 
N =100 
(0.001, -$5000) 
17 
(1, -$5) 
83* 
 
Note: N is the total number of subjects and * is the dominant choice 
  
Based on Table 2.3, in a gain domain, the expected payoff for S1 is $5 and S2 is 
$5. Both choices had the same expected payoff but people preferred S1 to S2. This 
showed that people overweighed very low probability (i.e. 0.001) in the gain domain, 
and explained why people still buy lottery tickets even though the probability of 
winning is very low.  In a loss domain, the expected payoff for S1 is -$5 and S2 is -
$5. Both choices had the same losses but people preferred S2 to S1. This showed that 
people under weighed high probability and preferred a very small loss in the loss 
domain, which explained why people are willing to pay excessive insurance 
premiums despite the low probability of a large loss.  
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2.2 Prospect Theory 
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b) provides a descriptive 
framework for the way people make choices in risky and uncertain situations (Baker 
& Nofsinger, 2002). Kahneman and Tversky (1979b) believe that humans make 
decisions based on the magnitude of the change in their gain and loss for each 
investment from their reference point, which is an asset‟s initial position. There are 
two key assumptions in prospect theory. First, a value function is concave for gain 
(meaning risk aversion), convex for loss (risk seeking) and steeper for loss than gain 
(loss aversion). Second, low probabilities are generally overweighed but moderate, 
and high probabilities are under weighed in rare events, especially in a loss domain.   
We first explain the first assumption of prospect theory, that the subjective 
value or utility is a concave function of money. In such a function, the difference 
between the utility of $200 and $100, for example, is greater than the utility 
difference between $1,200 and $1,100. It follows from concavity that the subjective 
value attached to a gain of $800 with probability 100% is more than the expected 
value of $1,000 with probability of 80%. Consequently, the concavity of the utility 
function entails a risk averse preference for a sure gain of $800 over an 80% chance 
to win $1,000 in the gain domain, although the two prospects have the same expected 
monetary value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  People do not react to the stated 
outcome (i.e.     ) but are influenced by subjective probability (ν). According to 
Kahneman (2011), diminishing sensitivity to changes in wealth causes human to 
behave in accordance to the first assumption.  
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In EU theory, the value or utility of an uncertain prospect is obtained by adding 
the probable outcomes or utilities, weighted by probability. People are assumed to 
weigh probability linearly, however, in prospect theory, the carrier of the value is 
gain and loss, not final outcome, and the value of each outcome is multiplied by a 
decision weight instead of an additive probability. Decision weight is the function of 
  that expresses the subjective evaluation of the objective probabilities, but it is not a 
probability and should not be interpreted as a measure of degree of belief (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992; Li, 1995).  
The value of the prospect is not a linear function for the probability of winning.  
Instead, the change of probability from 0% to 5% and 95% to 100% appears larger 
than a similar change of probability from 5% to 10% or 60% to 65% on the same 
scale. The change of probability from 0% to 5% creates a possibility effect that 
causes people to overweigh small probability by paying more than the expected 
value, such as when buying lottery ticket. The change of probability from 95% to 
100% creates a certainty effect, which causes people to under weigh outcomes that 
are certain compared with the justified probability. Possibility effect and certainty 
effect have greater impact in loss domain than gain domain (Kahneman, 2011). 
 
2.3 Prospect Theory and Trading Behaviours 
 
In prospect theory, trading behaviours are influenced by the initial wealth 
position and not the final outcome of the trade. Traders tend to be loss averse over 
fluctuations in the value of their financial portfolio, and the degree of loss aversion 
depends on the previous gains or losses in their investment. Traders are more 
sensitive to a reduction of their wealth compared with an increase in their wealth (i.e. 
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concavity in gain and convex in loss in the value function, in prospect theory). This 
suggests that traders are less risk averse when they have made prior gains, which 
motivate them to purchase more, which contributes to the deviation of stock price 
from its fundamental value. This is because the stock price is determined by the 
supply and demand of the stock in the securities market. When there is an increase in 
the demand of the stock, the price will increase and deviate from its fundamental 
value. Traders become risk averse when they have made prior losses, they become 
hesitant in their decision-making and tend to buy less (Barberis, Huang & Santos, 
2001). 
Probability weighing behaviour in prospect theory has been used to explain the 
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes as follows: risk seeking for gains and risk aversion 
for losses of low probability; risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of 
high probability. Risk seeking for low probability gains can help to explain the 
popularity of gambling, and risk aversion for low probability losses to explain 
people‟s tendency to buy excessive insurance to avoid loss (Tversky & Fox, 1995).  
Overconfidence bias is exhibited by traders (Odean, 1998; Chuang & Lee, 
2006) when traders overreact to private information and underreact to public 
information, trade more excessively after gains, cause excessive volatility in market 
and underestimate risk.  These behaviours are inconsistent with the rationality 
assumption in EU theory that people can make decisions rationally without the 
influence of emotion, and with perfect information.  Traders become risk seeking 
after a history of gain because of the effect of diminishing sensitivity, and this leads 
them become more confidence and trade more.  
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2.4 Relationship Between Prospect Theory, Cognitive Biases, Psychological 
Attributes and Overconfidence Bias 
 
 
Confirmation bias happens when people tend to look for confirming evidence 
that supports their beliefs, and ignore information that does not support their beliefs, 
especially when the decision is complex and uncertain. People with confirmation 
bias tend to miss important or useful information, which leads them to be 
miscalibrated and poor at decision-making.  It has been suggested that confirmation 
bias could result from information processing bias (Koriat et al., 1980; Nickerson, 
1998).  
When people suffer from information processing bias, they may suffer from 
probability-weighing anomalies by overweighing information that conforms to their 
beliefs or overweighing recent information, although the probability of the 
unexpected information impacting the market is unknown or very small. This leads 
them to be miscalibrated and exhibit overconfidence bias.  People with bias overreact 
to unexpected and dramatic news instead of observing the historical trends of 
dividend payout which cause stock prices to deviate from their fundamental values 
(details can be found in Bondt & Thaler, 1985, Thaler, 1999, Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974, Kahneman & Tversky, 1979a and Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b).  
Self-serving bias involves people's tendency to attribute positive outcomes to 
their own internal or personal factors, but attribute failure to external or situational 
factors. People with self-serving bias tend to give others less credit for success, and 
blame them more for failure than they ascribe to themselves (as cited in Taylor & 
Brown, 1988). It is noted that self-serving bias increases, especially after a history of 
gains or successes (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). According to the theory of self-
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serving bias, traders who have self-serving bias attribute their success in trading to 
their personal efforts and skills, and value themselves more highly than other traders, 
however, when they are not doing well in trading, they blame the failure to bad luck, 
or external factors such as feng shui.  Individuals who always think they are better 
than others are overconfident of their success. They will then overestimate their 
ability and judgment, resulting in poor decision-making. Traders tend to become 
overconfident and then increase their stock trading after gain, and then excessive 
trading leads to low or negative profit at the end of trading days (Odean, 1998, 1999; 
Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001; Dittrich et al., 2005; Chuang & Lee, 2006).   
Hindsight bias refers to situations where people distort their previous 
judgment, memory, actual facts or previous information based on the latest 
information received once an actual outcome is known. There are three levels of 
hindsight bias: memory distortion (I knew it would happen), inevitability (it had to 
happen) and foreseeability (I said it would happen) (Roese & Vohs, 2012).   
The memory distortion level (I knew it would happen) involves a failure in the 
recollection of previous judgment, which is caused by cognitive input such as the 
operation of memory. According to the operation of memory, hindsight bias can be 
induced during the stage of recollection and knowledge updating. Recollection errors 
happen when people fail to retrieve an answer and depend on what they now know to 
be the correct answer. Errors in knowledge updating are affected by the human 
memory system, which tends to adapt when taking new information and connecting 
it with what is already known.  When people cannot recall their previous answer, 
they tend to overweigh current information that causes them to believe that they have 
made the right decision and leads them to be overconfident. This is related to 
probability weighing anomalies in prospect theory.  
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Hindsight bias also leads traders to have positive illusions about their previous 
judgment and think they can control the outcome. Traders compare new information 
with their prior beliefs. For example, traders compare the new information to their 
previous beliefs after earnings announcements. In comparing the information, traders 
consider the difference between the latest and previous information. Memory 
distortion, inevitability and foreseeability means traders fail to retrieve their previous 
beliefs, which leads them to distort their initial beliefs, and consequently, believe the 
new information is the original beliefs. When traders with hindsight bias believe that 
they are always making a right judgment, this will lead them to be overconfident. 
“Hindsight bias may yield overconfidence that incites a reluctance to reassess one's 
own past actions” (Roese & Vohs, 2012).  This subsequently leads to errors in an 
trader's subsequent decision-making, and poor performance, especially in risky and 
uncertain environments like the stock market (Shiller, 2000; Biais & Weber, 2009).   
 
2.5 Summary 
 
There are much evidence for violations of EU theory, as discussed earlier, 
however, this thesis is not attempting to deny EU theory. This thesis focuses on the 
application of cognitive biases such as confirmation bias, self-serving bias and 
hindsight bias, to explain psychological attributes such as miscalibration, better than 
average effect and illusion of control. The relationship between cognitive biases and 
psychological attributes may help in understanding trading anomalies in the financial 
market as outlined earlier, and suggest solutions to minimise these misbehaviours in 
investment. In the next chapter, the thesis focuses on the related literature on 
overconfidence in psychology and finance, and solutions to the problem.  
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CHAPTER 3 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Overconfidence is often studied/discussed in the psychology literature. This 
thesis will fill the gaps in the current literature by examining the cognitive reasons 
for overconfidence, such as confirmation bias, self-serving bias and hindsight bias, 
and their relationship with psychological attributes such as miscalibration, better than 
average effect and illusion of control. This chapter begins with a review of literature 
related to overconfidence from the psychological perspective (Section 3.1), followed 
by a review of research on the issue of overconfidence in financial markets (Section 
3.2). Section 3.3 discusses related literature on solutions to overconfidence in the 
financial market, and Section 3.4 describes the gaps in the literature.  
 
3.1 Overconfidence in Psychology Theory 
 
Overconfidence is “excessive confidence.” The overconfidence effect involves 
a condition when someone's subjective confidence of their judgment is reliably 
greater than their objective accuracy, especially when confidence is relatively high. 
Pulford (1996) says that confidence is a feeling of certainty, and that the strength of 
this feeling reflects the level of confidence. There is an associated level of 
confidence with people‟s answers or decisions, whenever they make a prediction or 
decision. Self-confidence reflects a person's beliefs about their own abilities, self-
worth and value at any one time, and as belief changes, self-confidence can change 
too.  
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Moore and Healy (2008) define overconfidence as overestimation, 
overplacement and overprecision. Overestimation is when an individual thinks they 
are better than they really are. In overplacement, an individual thinks they are better 
than everyone else. Overprecision involves excessive precision in one's beliefs, such 
that the individual underestimates the noise in their information. In psychology, 
overconfidence is measured by miscalibration (Koriat et al., 1980; Lichtenstein et al., 
1981; Russo & Schoemaker, 1992; Brenner, Koehler, Liberman & Tversky, 1996; 
Alba & Hutchinson, 2000), better than average effect (Svenson, 1981; Fischhoff & 
MacGregor, 1982; Taylor & Brown, 1988) and illusion of control (Langer, 1975; 
Taylor & Brown, 1988). These three psychological attributes have been adopted in 
the economics and financial literature since 2000 (Glaser & Weber, 2007; Merkle & 
Weber, 2011; Smith, 2012).  
It is found that the confirmation bias is associated with miscalibration (Koriat 
et al., 1980), self-serving bias is associated with better than average effect (Alicke et 
al., 1995 & Alicke & Govorun, 2005) and hindsight bias is associated with illusion 
of control (Langer, 1975; Thompson et al., 1998). This thesis therefore focuses on 
these psychological attributes and their cognitive reasons as follows: confirmation 
bias and miscalibration, self-serving bias and better than average effect and hindsight 
bias and illusion of control.  Overconfidence has been widely recognised in 
psychology since the 1960s, and in economics and finance since the 1980s. Three 
main psychological attributes of overconfidence in psychology literature are 
miscalibration, better than average effect and illusion of control.  
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3.1.1 Overconfidence Operationalised as Miscalibration 
 
Miscalibration emerged from the theory of subjective probability judgment. 
The subjective expected utility (SEU) assumes that people act to maximise their 
SEU, which equals the sum of the utilities of the outcomes weighted by their 
subjective probability of occurrence instead of the objective probability of 
occurrence in expected utility (Tversky, 1967).  Objective probability is based on 
some basis of fact, analysis or experimentation, whereas subjective probability is 
based on people's intuition or guesses. Subjective probability is also defined as the 
subject's degree of belief in the correctness of a judgment or decision (Pulford, 
1996).  
According to Nau (2007), the formula of SEU can be written as    ( )  
  [ ( )]  ∑    (  )
 
   . Uncertainty about the future is represented by a finite set 
of states of the world, which is (E1,..., En), and possible outcomes are represented by 
a set of consequences. A decision alternative, known as an act, can be written as a 
vector x = (x1,..., xn), where xi is the consequence that is received in state Ei. Pi  is the 
subjective probability of Ei, which means the belief of the decision maker about the 
state of the world, and their value of consequences is represented by a utility function 
 ( ), in term of which the value they assign to an act x for decision-making purposes 
is their subjective expected utility (SEU(x)). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1972) concluded that the deviations of subjective 
probability from objective probability are proven, systematic and unavoidable.  This 
is because people tend not to follow the principles of probability theory in judging 
the likelihood of uncertain events.  Calibration study emerged as a measurement of 
the difference between the estimated subjective probability and actual objective 
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probability, because good calibration is critical in making good decisions (see 
Lichtenstein et al., 1981).  A person is miscalibrated if the estimated subjective 
probability is not equal to the actual objective probability. A person is well calibrated 
if the estimated subjective probability is equal to the actual objective probability. 
Miscalibration has been used as a tool to measure confidence levels.  
Miscalibration is defined as overestimation, based on Moore and Healy (2008). 
If the subjective probability of evaluating a probability assessment of a decision is 
higher than the objective probability, then a person is considered to be overconfident. 
If the objective probability of evaluating a probability assessment of a decision is 
higher than subjective probability, then a person is considered to be underconfident. 
In other words, people have poor calibration (are overconfident or underconfident) 
when they over- or underestimate the validity of their beliefs (Pulford, 1996).  
 According to Lichtenstein et al. (1981), “Calibration measures the validity of 
probability assessments. Being well calibrated is critical for optimal decision-making 
and for the development of decision aiding techniques.” A person is well calibrated if 
all statements are assigned a given probability, and in the long run, the proportion 
that is true is equal to the probability assigned. For example, if an individual assigns 
a probability of 0.75 to a probability assessment, in the long run, if it turns out to be 
true 75% of the time, the individual is considered well calibrated. If only 65% of the 
time it turns out to be true, the individual is not well calibrated, and is considered to 
be “overconfident.” If 85% of the time it turns out to be true, the individual is 
considered “underconfident.”  The concept of calibration is the most widely adopted 
in literature, and it will be adopted in this thesis too. 
 
